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People are often more likely to accept risky monetary gambles with positive expected values when the gambles
will be played more than once. We investigated whether this distinction between single-play and multiple-play
gambles extends to medical treatments for individual patients and groups of patients. Resident physicians and
medical students (n = 69) and undergraduates (n = 99) ranked 9 different flu shots and a no-flu-shot option in
1 of 4 combinations of perspective (individual patient vs. group of 1000 patients) and uncertainty frame
(probability vs. frequency). The rank of the no-flu-shot option (a measure of preference for treatment vs. no
treatment) was not significantly related to perspective or participant population. The main effect of
uncertainty frame and the interaction between perspective and uncertainty frame approached significance
(0.1 > p > 0.05), with the no-flu-shot option faring particularly poorly (treatment faring particularly well)
when decisions about many patients were based on frequency information. Undergraduate participants
believed that the no-flu-shot option would be less attractive (treatment would be more attractive) in decisions
about many patients, but these intuitions were inconsistent with the actual ranks. These results and those of
other studies suggest that medical treatments for individuals and groups are not analogous to single-play and
multiple-play monetary gambles, perhaps because many people are unwilling to aggregate treatment
outcomes over patients in the same way that they would compute net gains or losses over monetary gambles.
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Abstract
People are often more likely to accept risky monetary gambles with positive expected values when the gambles will be
played more than once. We investigated whether this distinction between single-play and multiple-play gambles extends
to medical treatments for individual patients and groups of patients. Resident physicians and medical students (n = 69)
and undergraduates (n = 99) ranked 9 different flu shots and a no-flu-shot option in 1 of 4 combinations of perspective
(individual patient vs. group of 1000 patients) and uncertainty frame (probability vs. frequency). The rank of the no-
flu-shot option (a measure of preference for treatment vs. no treatment) was not significantly related to perspective or
participant population. The main effect of uncertainty frame and the interaction between perspective and uncertainty
frame approached significance (0.1 > p > 0.05), with the no-flu-shot option faring particularly poorly (treatment faring
particularly well) when decisions about many patients were based on frequency information. Undergraduate participants
believed that the no-flu-shot option would be less attractive (treatment would be more attractive) in decisions about many
patients, but these intuitions were inconsistent with the actual ranks. These results and those of other studies suggest that
medical treatments for individuals and groups are not analogous to single-play and multiple-play monetary gambles,
perhaps because many people are unwilling to aggregate treatment outcomes over patients in the same way that they
would compute net gains or losses over monetary gambles.
Keywords: aggregation, fungibility, individuals versus groups, medical treatment decisions, multiple-play, repeated-
play.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Single-play and multiple-play gambles
A convincing body of research demonstrates that peo-
ple often make different choices when making multiple-
play decisions than when making single-play decisions.
Samuelson (1963) initiated this literature with a reveal-
ing anecdote about a lunch colleague who would reject
a single gamble with an even chance of winning $200
or losing $100, but who would accept a series of 100
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such gambles. Subsequently, several studies have indi-
cated that people are more likely to accept mixed gambles
(i.e., gambles involving a possible gain and a possible
loss) with positive expected values (EVs) when the gam-
bles will be played more than once (Benartzi & Thaler,
1999; DeKay & Kim, 2005; Keren, 1991; Klos, Weber,
& Weber, 2005; Langer & Weber, 2001; Li, 2003; Re-
delmeier & Tversky, 1992; Wedell & Böckenholt, 1994),
although the opposite result has been also been observed
(Benartzi & Thaler, 1999; Langer & Weber, 2001). Mul-
tiple plays of Samuelson-type gambles are particularly
attractive when participants are shown the distribution
of possible outcomes resulting from repeated plays (Be-
nartzi & Thaler, 1999; DeKay & Kim, 2005; Langer &
Weber, 2001; Redelmeier & Tversky, 1992).
Although the rationality of making different choices
for single-play and multiple-play gambles has been de-
bated (Lopes, 1981, 1996; Nielsen, 1985; Ross, 1999;
Samuelson, 1963; Schoemaker & Hershey, 1996; Tver-
sky & Bar-Hillel, 1983), this article is concerned pri-
marily with the empirical distinction. Related research
shows that multiple plays may also increase the attrac-
tiveness of higher-EV unmixed gambles (Montgomery &
Adelbratt, 1982; but see Chen & Corter, 2006, for con-
flicting evidence); reduce the incidence of certainty and
possibility effects (Barron & Erev, 2003, Experiment 5;
Keren, 1991; Keren & Wagenaar, 1987); reduce choos-
ing/pricing preference reversals (Wedell & Böckenholt,
1990); reduce the “illusion of control” (Budescu & Bru-
derman, 1995; Koehler, Gibbs, & Hogarth, 1994); and
facilitate the multiplicative combination of probabilities
and outcomes (Joag, Mowen, & Gentry, 1990). Taken
together, these results indicate that choices and prefer-
ences are often more consistent with expected value the-
ory and/or expected utility theory when multiple plays are
considered.
2 Medical treatments for individu-
als and groups
One limitation of the research cited above is that the stud-
ies have focused almost exclusively on monetary gambles
or other financial decisions (e.g., Joag et al., 1990, studied
industrial purchasing decisions). A few researchers have
attempted to assess whether the results generalize to deci-
sions about medical treatments. For example, Redelmeier
and Tversky (1992) reported that physicians and students
were more likely to recommend a risky positive-EV treat-
ment to an individual patient with chronic knee pain when
they considered repeated treatments rather than a single
treatment. This finding is consistent with those for mon-
etary gambles.
More frequently, studies have involved the treatment
of multiple patients rather than multiple treatments of the
same patient. Redelmeier and Tversky (1990) reported
that physicians and students who considered an individ-
ual patient (the individual perspective) often made differ-
ent decisions from those who considered a group of com-
parable patients (the group perspective). In their adverse-
outcomes scenario, for example, students who considered
an individual woman with a blood condition were more
likely to recommend a risky positive-EV treatment than
were participants who considered many women. This
result and others reported by Redelmeier and Tversky
(1990) appear to contradict the literature on single-play
and multiple-play gambles. If treating a group of sim-
ilar patients is analogous to playing a gamble multiple
times, one might predict that a risky positive-EV treat-
ment would be viewed more favorably in the group per-
spective than in the individual perspective.
However, other researchers have not found significant
differences between medical treatments for individuals
and groups. DeKay et al. (2000) were unable to replicate
Redelmeier and Tversky’s (1990) results for the adverse-
outcomes scenario, despite ample statistical power. In-
deed, participants were slightly more likely to recom-
mend treatment in the group perspective when the word-
ing of the response options was improved. DeKay and
Kim (2005) also reported no significant difference be-
tween the individual and group perspectives for a closely
related scenario. Hux, Levinton, and Naylor (1994)
found no evidence that physicians’ willingness to pre-
scribe a medication to an individual patient differed from
their willingness to recommend the medication in a prac-
tice guideline. Finally, Spranca, Minsk, and Baron (1991)
and Ritov and Baron (1990) reported nonsignificant ef-
fects of perspective for students’ evaluations of a risky
medical procedure and a risky flu vaccination, respec-
tively.1
Understanding these results is important because med-
ical practice guidelines frequently reflect the group per-
spective adopted in randomized clinical trials, decision
analyses, and cost-effectiveness analyses. If people think
differently about medical treatments for individuals and
groups, these differences may help to explain why physi-
cians often deviate from practice guidelines when treating
individual patients (Asch & Hershey, 1995; Kosecoff et
al., 1987; Lomas et al., 1989; Sackett, 1989; Sorum et al.,
2003; Timmermans, Sprij, & de Bel, 1996; Woo, Woo,
Cook, Weisberg, & Goldman, 1985). If not, then expla-
1 Spranca et al.’s (1991) and Ritov and Baron’s (1990) studies of
omission bias were not about risk per se, as the action and inaction al-
ternatives both involved risk. In the study presented in the next section,
actions were risker than omissions, but this was not clearly the case
in the omission-bias studies. The studies are cited here because they
compared decisions affecting one patient with decisions affecting many
patients.
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nations for the discrepancy between practice guidelines
and actual practice must be sought elsewhere.
3 Study: Ranking several treat-
ment options and a no-treatment
option
3.1 Overview
The study described here was designed to provide addi-
tional insight into the distinction between medical deci-
sions for individuals and groups. Although the study did
not involve monetary gambles, our use of risky positive-
EV treatments allows a straightforward comparison to the
literature on single and multiple plays of mixed monetary
gambles.
This investigation extends previous research on med-
ical decisions for individuals and groups in three ways.
First, we utilized a new task that involved ranking sev-
eral treatment options (different flu shots) and a no-
treatment option, with the rank of the no-treatment op-
tion serving as the primary dependent measure. This task
may have been more subtle than the dichotomous-choice
and single-treatment rating tasks used in previous stud-
ies (DeKay & Kim, 2005; DeKay et al., 2000; Hux et
al., 1994; Redelmeier & Tversky, 1990). It was some-
what similar to the separate ratings of the treatment and
no-treatment options in studies of omission bias (Ritov &
Baron, 1990; Spranca et al., 1991), although there were
more treatment options in this study.
Second, we included the framing of uncertainty as an
additional variable. Perspective (individual vs. group)
and uncertainty frame (probability vs. frequency) have
occasionally been confounded in past research (e.g., Re-
delmeier & Tversky, 1990; Spranca et al., 1991), presum-
ably because it is natural to describe uncertainty in terms
of probabilities when considering an individual and in
terms of frequencies when considering a group. This con-
found is potentially important because reasoning is of-
ten improved when frequencies rather than probabilities
are used, although the reasons and required conditions
for this performance difference are still debated (Cos-
mides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1991, 1996a, 1996b;
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Kahneman & Tversky,
1996; Mellers, Hertwig, & Kahneman, 2001; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1983). DeKay et al. (2000) crossed per-
spective and uncertainty frame and found that uncertainty
frame was not a significant predictor of treatment recom-
mendations. Our design was similar, but we used abso-
lute frequencies (e.g., 600 out of 1000 people) rather than
relative frequencies (e.g., 60% of people) in this study,
because relative frequencies may be treated more like
probabilities (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995).
Third, we asked both medical experts (resident physi-
cians and medical students) and undergraduates to com-
plete the same task, because previous studies have var-
ied in their use of physician and lay participants. Re-
delmeier and Tversky (1990) surveyed both physicians
and students (for different questions), Hux et al. (1994)
surveyed physicians, DeKay et al. (2000) surveyed the
general public, and the remaining studies of medical de-
cisions for individuals and groups used student partici-
pants.
3.2 Method
3.2.1 Design
Perspective (individual vs. group), uncertainty frame
(probability vs. frequency), and participant population
(resident physicians and medical students vs. undergrad-
uates) were crossed in a 2 × 2 × 2 between-participants
factorial design. Participants from each population were
randomly assigned to the four versions of survey materi-
als.
3.2.2 Participants
Fifty-eight resident physicians in internal medicine and
13 advanced medical students from the Hospital of the
University of Pennsylvania received cookies in return for
their participation. The mean age was 28 (range = 22–
48) and 49% were female. Two residents were dropped
because they did not rank all of the treatment options.
Ninety-nine undergraduates were recruited by placing
signs in the University of Pennsylvania Department of
Psychology. They received $6.00 per hour for participa-
tion in various experiments. Demographic data were not
collected.
3.2.3 Materials and procedures
Participants read a cover story describing “a new strain
of flu that is likely to sweep the region in the next few
months.” In the frequency frame, participants were told:
“If no vaccine is administered, 600 out of every 1000 peo-
ple in this region are expected to catch the flu. 400 out
of every 1000 people are expected not to catch the flu.
Unfortunately, there is no way to predict ahead of time
who will catch the flu and who will not.” The story also
indicated that nine new vaccines had been developed to
combat this strain of flu and that these vaccines had been
tested on “a large sample of patients who are very similar
to your patients.” In addition to reducing the number of
patients who would catch the flu, the vaccines were also
said to lead to occasional “adverse reactions” that were
“TWICE AS BAD as catching the flu.”
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We provided participants with a shuffled deck of 10
cards describing the vaccines and the “No Flu Shot” op-
tion and asked them to rank the options from best (1) to
worst (10). In the frequency frame, the cards included bar
graphs depicting the “Distribution of Patient Outcomes”
(i.e., the “Number of Patients” expected to experience
the three possible outcomes: “Reaction,” “Flu,” and “No
Flu”), along with an “Average Quality of Life” score (de-
fined as “the mean of the distribution of patient outcomes
when the worst possible outcome is given a score of 0 and
the best possible outcome is given a score of 100”) and
an “Outcome Variability” score (the standard deviation
of that distribution). In the probability frame, the text and
graphs used “Percent Chance,” “Distribution of Possible
Outcomes,” “Expected Quality of Life,” and “Outcome
Uncertainty” instead. Figure 1 provides two examples
of the stimuli. Table 1 describes all nine vaccines and
the no-flu-shot option. Note that all of the vaccines had
higher average-quality-of-life scores than the no-flu-shot
option, so that they might appear realistic.
In the individual and group perspectives, participants
were asked to think about which of the 10 options they
would recommend to their “individual patient” or to their
“1000 patients,” respectively. Undergraduates also indi-
cated whether the no-flu-shot option would appear better
or worse if viewed from the other perspective. For ex-
ample, participants who had ranked the options in the in-
dividual perspective were asked, “Do you think the No
Flu Shot option would appear better or worse if you were
treating 1000 similar patients?”
3.3 Hypotheses
Based on previous research, we expected that perspective
would not significantly affect treatment preferences. We
also expected that the effect of uncertainty frame would
be nonsignificant, based on DeKay et al.’s (2000) result.
We did not have specific expectations for the effect of
participant population, for interactions between the three
predictors, or for undergraduates’ intuitions regarding the
adoption of the alternative perspective. The study was
exploratory with respect to those issues.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Rank of the no-flu-shot option
The mean rank of the no-flu-shot option was 8.29 (where
1 = best option and 10 = worst option; see Table 1); only
flu shot D was ranked worse (M = 9.02). In fact, 56.5%
of participants ranked the no-flu-shot option as worst (see
Table 2), perhaps because all of the flu shots had higher
EVs. The rank of the no-flu-shot option and the per-
centage of participants ranking it as worst may be con-
sidered measures of participants’ relative preference for
treatment versus no treatment in the different conditions
of the study. The higher the rank and the greater the per-
centage, the more treatment was preferred.
We conducted a 2 (perspective) × 2 (uncertainty
frame) × 2 (participant population) ANOVA for predict-
ing the rank of the no-flu-shot option, using standard
regression techniques for contrast-coded predictors and
their interactions (Judd & McClelland, 1989). Results in-
dicated a nearly significant effect of uncertainty frame,
F(1, 160) = 3.20, p = 0.076, such that the no-flu-shot
option was ranked worse (treatment was ranked better)
when frequencies were used (M = 8.60) than when prob-
abilities were used (M = 7.98; see Table 2).
There was also a nearly significant interaction between
perspective and uncertainty frame, F(1, 160) = 2.89, p
= 0.092, with the no-flu-shot option receiving partic-
ularly low evaluations (treatment receiving particularly
high evaluations) when the group perspective was cou-
pled with frequency information (see Table 2). The dif-
ference between the mean ranks of the no-flu-shot op-
tion in the individual and group conditions was positive
in the probability frame (individual – group = 8.40 – 7.54
= 0.86) but negative in the frequency frame (8.39 – 8.79
= –0.40). However, the effect of perspective was not sig-
nificant in either frame, both Fs ≤ 2.22, both ps ≥ 0.141.
Looking at the interaction the other way, the difference
between no-flu-shot ranks in the frequency and proba-
bility frames was positive in the group perspective (fre-
quency – probability = 8.79 – 7.54 = 1.25) but close to
zero in the individual perspective (8.39 – 8.40 = –0.01).
The simple effect of uncertainty frame was significant in
the group perspective, F(1, 80) = 6.00, p = 0.016, but
not in the individual perspective, F < 1, suggesting that
the distinction between probabilities and frequencies was
more relevant when many patients were considered.
No other main effects or interactions approached sig-
nificance, all Fs < 1. In particular, the effect size for the
main effect of perspective, f 2 = 0.0026 (Cohen, Cohen,
West, & Aiken, 2003, p. 94), was much smaller than that
for Redelmeier and Tvesky’s (1990) adverse-outcomes
scenario, f 2 = 0.045, and similar to that in DeKay et al.’s
(2000) exact replication of the adverse-outcomes sce-
nario, f 2 = 0.0035. In this study, the power for detect-
ing an effect as large as that reported by Redelmeier and
Tversksy (1990) was 0.78. The power for detecting a
“medium” effect was greater than 0.99 if medium is de-
fined as f 2 = 0.15 (Cohen et al., p. 95). Our observed
effect was noticeably smaller than Cohen et al.’s “small”
effect of f 2 = 0.02.
When only the individual/probability and
group/frequency conditions were considered, as in
Redelmeier and Tversky (1990), the difference was not
significant, F < 1, f 2 = 0.0097. Consistent with the above
interaction, the direction of this nonsignificant difference
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Figure 1: Examples of stimuli that appeared on cards. The no-flu-shot option is shown in the probability frame and flu
shot F (the best of the flu shots) is shown in the frequency frame.
was opposite that reported by Redelmeier and Tversky
(1990), with the no-flu-shot option faring slightly worse
(treatment faring slightly better) in the group/frequency
condition than in the individual/probability condition
(see Table 2).
In sum, these analyses indicate that the distinction be-
tween the individual and group perspectives was not par-
ticularly important for this task, although perspective may
have moderated the effect of uncertainty frame. However,
it is possible that the nonsignificant results were caused
by a floor effect involving the rank of the no-flu-shot op-
tion. To address this concern, we dropped participants
who ranked that option as worst. The remaining 73 par-
ticipants ranked the no-flu-shot option very similarly in
the individual and group perspectives (M = 6.14 and M
= 5.97, respectively). There were no significant effects
in the three-way ANOVA, all Fs ≤ 2.19, all ps ≥ 0.144,
indicating that the original results were not due to a floor
effect.2
2 An additional concern about the original (full-sample) ANOVA
involved the residuals. Because the distribution of no-flu-shot ranks
was skewed, the distribution of residuals was also skewed. We ad-
dressed this issue in two ways. First, we re-ran the ANOVA after
rank-transforming the original data. Skew in the residuals dropped from
−1.18 to−0.53. Results were the same as before, except that the effect
of uncertainty frame was not significant, F(1, 160) = 1.85. p = 0.175.
The simple effect of uncertainty frame remained significant in the group
perspective, F(1, 80) = 4.71, p = 0.033. Second, we conducted logistic
regressions to predict the percentage of participants ranking the no-flu-
shot option as worst (i.e., to assess whether there were effects of per-
spective or other variables on the percentage of participants choosing
the “floor” for that option). When participant population and its inter-
actions were omitted, results were the same as those for the original
analysis, except that the effect of uncertainty frame was not significant,
3.4.2 Within-participant regressions
Although the mean rank of the no-flu-shot option did not
vary significantly as a function of perspective, it is possi-
ble that participants in the different conditions weighted
other information (e.g., the chance of an adverse reaction)
differently when ranking the options, and that the no-flu-
shot option was rated as systematically better or worse
than might be expected on the basis of that information.
To assess this possibility, we conducted a series of within-
participant regressions. Two models (2 and 4) included a
dummy code for the no-flu-shot option, whereas the other
two (1 and 3) did not.
In model 1, we regressed the ranks of the 10 options
onto the percentage of patients expected to experience ad-
verse reactions and the percentage expected to experience
neither adverse reactions nor the flu (in the individual per-
spective, we used the percent chance of these outcomes).
The mean unstandardized regression coefficients appear
in Table 3. As expected, participants gave higher (worse)
ranks to options with more adverse reactions, and lower
(better) ranks to options with more no-flu outcomes, both
|t|s ≥ 25.07, both ps < 0.0001. In model 3, we used
average quality of life (or expected quality of life) and
outcome variability (or outcome uncertainty) as predic-
tors. As expected, participants gave lower (better) ranks
to options with higher average quality of life and higher
OR = 1.30, Wald χ2 = 2.77, p = 0.274, and the simple effect of uncer-
tainty frame was not quite significant in the group perspective, OR =
1.54, Wald χ2 = 3.75, p = 0.053. As before, the distinction between the
individual and group perspectives appeared unimportant in these analy-
ses.
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Table 1: Attributes (frequency versions) and mean ranks of treatment options, including the no-flu-shot option.
Expected number of patients
with each outcome
Adverse Average Outcome
Optiona reaction Flu No flu quality of life uncertainty Mean rankb
No flu shot 0 600 400 70.0 24.5 8.29 (0.19)
Flu shot F 50 150 800 87.5 26.8 1.25 (0.07)
Flu shot A 50 250 700 82.5 28.6 3.38 (0.11)
Flu shot B 50 350 600 77.5 29.5 5.90 (0.14)
Flu shot G 100 100 800 85.0 32.0 2.72 (0.11)
Flu shot E 100 200 700 80.0 33.2 5.02 (0.08)
Flu shot I 100 300 600 75.0 33.5 7.61 (0.09)
Flu shot C 150 50 800 82.5 36.3 4.90 (0.17)
Flu shot H 150 150 700 77.5 37.0 6.90 (0.12)
Flu shot D 150 250 600 72.5 37.0 9.02 (0.09)
a Flu-shot options were assigned random letters for identification purposes.
b Options that were viewed more favorably have lower ranks (1 = best option, 10 = worst option).
Standard errors are in parentheses.
(worse) ranks to options with higher outcome variabil-
ity, both |t|s ≥ 8.40, both ps < 0.0001. The results of both
models are consistent with loss aversion (i.e., steeper util-
ity functions below a reference point than above it) and
with risk aversion (i.e., concave utility functions). For
example, the relative magnitude of the two coefficients in
model 1 (0.349/0.223 = 1.57) is consistent with loss aver-
sion, assuming that our cover story established “catching
the flu” as the reference point. Participants’ self-reported
information use provided additional support for this refer-
ence point and for loss aversion or risk aversion (analyses
omitted for brevity).
In models 2 and 4, we added a dummy code for the
no-flu-shot option to models 1 and 3, respectively. The
coefficient for the dummy code was not significantly dif-
ferent from zero in either case, t(167) = –1.06, p = 0.293
in model 2 and t(167) = –0.08, p = 0.933 in model 4.
The fact that the no-flu-shot option was not given spe-
cial standing suggests that status-quo bias (Samuelson &
Zeckhauser, 1988) and omission bias (Baron, 1992; Ri-
tov & Baron, 1990, 1992; Spranca et al., 1991) were rel-
atively unimportant in the ranking task.
To assess whether information use varied across con-
ditions, we used the 10 coefficients for the predictor vari-
ables in models 1–4 of Table 3 as the dependent vari-
ables in a series of 2 (perspective)× 2 (uncertainty frame)
ANOVAs. None of the 30 main effects and interactions
was significant at the p < 0.05 level, suggesting that rea-
soning was similar across conditions. Results were very
similar when we dropped those participants who ranked
the no-flu-shot alternative as worst, and when we consid-
ered only the individual/probability and group/frequency
conditions, as in Redelmeier and Tversky (1990). In fact,
the mean coefficients for percentage with adverse reac-
tion, percentage with no flu, average quality of life, and
outcome variability were significantly different from zero
in all four combinations of perspective and uncertainty
frame, |t|s ≥ 2.45, ps ≤ 0.018 in 31 of 32 tests, and t(42)
= 1.83, p = 0.074 in the 32nd (8 coefficients × 4 condi-
tions = 32 tests). In contrast, the mean coefficient for the
no-flu-shot dummy code never approached significance,
all |t|s ≤ 1.15, all ps ≥ 0.258 in eight tests (2 coefficients
× 4 conditions = 8 tests). Thus, these analyses yielded
no evidence whatsoever that the relative preference for
treatment versus no treatment was related to perspective
or uncertainty frame.
3.4.3 Undergraduates’ intuitions about different
numbers of patients
When asked whether the no-flu-shot option would appear
better or worse if viewed from the other perspective (e.g.,
if they were treating 1000 patients instead of just one),
73% of undergraduates who responded indicated that it
would. We used ordinal logistic regression to predict
whether the no-flu-shot option would appear worse than,
the same as, or better than it had in the original perspec-
tive, using perspective change, uncertainty frame, and
their interaction as predictors. Responses were signifi-
cantly related to perspective change, OR = 1.82, Wald χ2
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Table 2: Mean ranks of the no-flu-shot option and percentages of participants ranking the no-flu-shot option as worst.
Perspective
Individual Group Total
Participants Frame M % M % M %
Physicians Probability 8.33 (0.66) 66.7 (11.1) 7.29 (0.78) 41.2 (11.9) 7.83 (0.51) 54.3 (8.4)
Frequency 8.56 (0.58) 68.8 (11.6) 9.00 (0.40) 66.7 (11.1) 8.79 (0.35) 67.6 (8.0)
Total 8.44 (0.44) 67.6 (8.0) 8.17 (0.45) 54.3 (8.4) 8.30 (0.31) 60.9 (5.9)
Undergraduates Probability 8.44 (0.45) 56.0 (9.9) 7.71 (0.53) 45.8 (10.2) 8.08 (0.35) 51.0 (7.1)
Frequency 8.28 (0.45) 48.0 (10.0) 8.64 (0.41) 64.0 (9.6) 8.46 (0.30) 56.0 (7.0)
Total 8.36 (0.32) 52.0 (7.1) 8.18 (0.34) 55.1 (7.1) 8.27 (0.23) 53.5 (5.0)
All participants Probability 8.40 (0.38) 60.5 (7.5) 7.54 (0.44) 43.9 (7.8) 7.98 (0.29) 52.4 (5.4)
Frequency 8.39 (0.35) 56.1 (7.8) 8.79 (0.29) 65.1 (7.3) 8.60 (0.23) 60.7 (5.3)
Total 8.39 (0.26) 58.3 (5.4) 8.18 (0.27) 54.8 (5.4) 8.29 (0.19) 56.5 (3.8)
Note. Options that were viewed more favorably have lower ranks (1 = best option, 10 = worst option). Higher
means and percentages imply that the no-flu-shot option was viewed less favorably, and that treatment was viewed
more favorably. Standard errors are in parentheses.
= 8.78, p = 0.003, but not to uncertainty frame, OR = 1.09,
Wald χ2 = 0.18, p = 0.674 (see Table 4). Participants who
originally considered one patient said that the no-flu-shot
option would appear worse (treatment would appear bet-
ter) if they considered 1000 patients, S = –144.5 for the
Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0.002. Participants who
originally considered 1000 patients said that the no-flu-
shot option would appear better (treatment would appear
worse) if they considered one patient, but this trend was
not significant, S = 70, p = 0.174.
The main effect of perspective change was qualified
by a nearly significant interaction with uncertainty frame,
OR = 1.39, Wald χ2 = 2.73, p = 0.098, such that the above
effects of perspective change were stronger in the fre-
quency frame than in the probability frame (see Table 4).
For frequencies, the simple effect of perspective change
was significant, OR = 2.56, Wald χ2 = 9.83, p = 0.002,
with the no-flu-shot option appearing worse (treatment
appearing better) when perspective shifted from the indi-
vidual to the group. For probabilities, the simple effect of
perspective change was in the same direction, but was not
significant, OR = 1.31, Wald χ2 = 0.93, p = 0.335. View-
ing the interaction the other way, the effect of uncertainty
frame was not significant for either shift of perspective,
both ps ≥ 0.183.
Undergraduates’ intuitions that treatment would be
more attractive in the group perspective were consis-
tent with the greater appeal of risky monetary gambles
in multiple-play situations, but these intuitions were not
borne out by the actual ranks of the no-flu-shot option
(see Table 2). Interestingly, however, the interaction re-
ported above was in the same direction as that in the anal-
ysis of actual ranks. Although the simple effects were
somewhat different in the two analyses, the no-flu-shot
option fared particularly poorly (treatment fared partic-
ularly well) when frequency information was combined
with the group perspective (or a shift to the group per-
spective).
4 Discussion
In this study, preferences for treatment options were very
similar in the individual and group perspectives. This
result and those of other studies (DeKay & Kim, 2005;
DeKay et al., 2000; Hux et al., 1994; Ritov & Baron,
1990; Spranca et al., 1991) conflict with Redelmeier and
Tversky’s (1990) finding that treatment is more likely to
be preferred for individuals than for groups. Our data
help to eliminate differences in uncertainty frames and
participant populations as explanations for this discrep-
ancy in the literature. More important, all of these stud-
ies (including Redelemeier & Tversky, 1990) suggest that
the relatively robust distinction between single-play and
repeated-play monetary gambles does not extend to med-
ical treatments for individuals and groups.
One promising explanation for this result is that people
are willing to aggregate monetary outcomes over multi-
ple plays (e.g., to think of five gains of $200 and five
losses of $100 as a net gain of $500), but unwilling to
aggregate outcomes of medical treatments over multiple
patients (e.g., to think of five patients each gaining 10
years of life and five other patients each losing 2 years
of life as a net gain of 40 years). For multiple-play gam-
bles in which one person may win money on some plays
and lose money on others, it is reasonable (even norma-
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Table 3: Mean unstandardized regression coefficients from within-participant regressions for predicting ranks of treat-
ment options, including the no-flu-shot option.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercepta 17.305****
(0.392)
17.713****
(0.634)
34.861****
(1.320)
34.983****
(2.343)
Percentage with adverse
reaction (worst outcome)
0.349****
(0.014)
0.343****
(0.017)
Percentage with no flu
(best outcome)
–0.223****
(0.005)
–0.228****
(0.008)
Average quality of life –0.432****
(0.012)
–0.433****
(0.019)
Outcome variability 0.149****
(0.018)
0.147****
(0.028)
No-flu-shot option
(dummy)
–0.312
(0.296)
–0.028
(0.340)
Mean adjusted R2 0.847 0.903 0.836 0.898
Note. Options that were viewed more favorably have lower ranks (1 = best option, 10 =
worst option). For predictor variables, a positive coefficient means that higher values of
the predictor variable were associated with options that were ranked higher (worse). A
negative coefficient means that higher values of the predictor variable were associated with
options that were ranked lower (better). Standard errors of mean regression coefficients
(not mean standard errors) are in parentheses.
a Intercepts are not meaningful because no options had values of zero on all predictor
variables.
****p < 0.0001 for a t test of the hypothesis that the mean regression coefficient equals zero.
tive) to consider the distribution of aggregate outcomes
(Benartzi & Thaler, 1999; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993;
Read, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 1999; Redelmeier & Tver-
sky, 1992). Risky positive-EV gambles are often more
appealing when possible outcomes are aggregated over
multiple plays prior to evaluation, perhaps because rep-
etition reduces the probability of losing money (some-
times to near zero). However, when medical treatments
for multiple patients are considered, aggregation may be
inappropriate because the gains and losses experienced
by different patients do not necessarily offset each other
in any real sense (Asch, 1990; Asch & Hershey, 1995).
This line of reasoning is normatively controversial, and
conflicts with standard practice for cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness analyses in healthcare and other domains.
Nonetheless, if people are reluctant to aggregate possi-
ble outcomes over patients prior to evaluating treatments,
then the analogy between monetary gambles and medi-
cal treatments breaks down, and treatments are likely to
be evaluated similarly in the individual and group per-
spectives. In other words, people considering decisions
for multiple patients may make those decisions as if they
were considering only one patient.
Evidence for this explanation comes from two sources.
First, Redelmeier and Tversky’s (1992) result for mul-
tiple treatments of one patient paralleled results for
repeated-play monetary gambles rather than those for the
treatment of multiple patients, suggesting that partici-
pants were willing to aggregate medical outcomes ex-
perienced by an individual. Second, DeKay and Kim
(2005; DeKay, Kim, & Tuma, 2003) reported that the per-
ceived fungibility of outcomes over multiple plays (i.e.,
the appropriateness of aggregating outcomes over plays)
was lower for risky medical treatments involving multi-
ple patients — including treatments based on Redelmeier
and Tversky’s (1990) adverse-outcomes scenario — than
for multiple plays of risky monetary gambles involving
a single person or firm. Barriers to aggregation also
affected the perceived fungibility of outcomes in non-
medical situations, as when monetary outcomes would
be experienced by different people, when frequent-flier
miles would be credited to (one person’s) different ac-
counts, and when meal tickets could be used only on spe-
cific dates. Moreover, the increased attractiveness of re-
peated plays relative to a single play (the standard result
for monetary gambles with outcomes experienced by the
same person) was lower in situations with less fungible
outcomes, even though probabilities and relative gains
and losses were equated across situations. Apparently,
the aggregate-then-evaluate sequence that is assumed to
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Table 4: Numbers of undergraduates reporting that the no-flu-shot option would appear worse, the same, or better if
viewed from the other perspective.
Evaluation of the no-flu-shot option in the new perspective
Worse than in Same as in Better than in
Change in perspective original original original
Frame (original =⇒ new) perspective perspective perspective
Probability Individual =⇒ group 11 8 5
Group =⇒ individual 8 5 8
Frequency Individual =⇒ group 14 7 3
Group =⇒ individual 5 5 13
Total Individual =⇒ group 25 15 8
Group =⇒ individual 13 10 21
underlie choice differences between single and multiple
plays of gambles with fungible outcomes (Benartzi &
Thaler, 1999; DeKay & Kim, 2005; Keren, 1991; Klos
et al., 2005; Langer & Weber, 2001; Lopes, 1981, 1996;
Nielsen, 1985; Redelmeier & Tversky, 1992; Ross, 1999;
Samuelson, 1963; Schoemaker & Hershey, 1996; Tver-
sky & Bar-Hillel, 1983; Wedell & Böckenholt, 1994) is
blocked when outcomes are perceived as nonfungible.
With nonfungible outcomes, people appear to make the
decision for a single gamble (or for an individual patient)
and apply that decision directly to the series of gambles
(or to the group of patients). Thus, if most participants
in this study were unwilling to aggregate gains and losses
over patients, one would expect little or no difference be-
tween the individual and group perspectives.
At least two alternative models are also consistent with
our results that participants were loss averse or risk averse
and that they made similar treatment decisions in the in-
dividual and group perspectives. In the first alternative
model, participants in the group perspective evaluate the
decision for an individual patient as usual (e.g., in a loss-
averse or risk-averse manner) and then scale this evalua-
tion linearly to the group of patients. This linear aggre-
gation over patients leads to the same decision as simply
applying the one-patient decision to the group of patients
without aggregation.
In the second alternative model, participants in the
group perspective evaluate each of the three possible out-
comes (adverse reactions, flu, and no flu) as usual (e.g., in
a loss-averse or risk-averse manner) and then scale these
evaluations linearly to the number of patients likely to ex-
perience those outcomes. This aggregation of evaluations
is conducted separately for the three types of outcomes.
Finally, the three aggregate evaluations are combined lin-
early into an overall evaluation (i.e., with no additional
loss aversion or risk aversion). Because the numbers of
patients expected to experience each outcome are propor-
tional to the probabilities for an individual patient, the
final evaluation is predicted to be the same in the group
perspective as in the individual perspective.
Although the two alternative models do allow aggre-
gation, they are similar to our nonfungible-outcomes ac-
count in that they avoid aggregating dissimilar outcomes
over patients. The primary evaluation of gains and losses
occurs prior to aggregation, in contrast to the standard
aggregate-then-evaluate model for the difference between
single-play and multiple-play monetary gambles. Both
of the alternative models assume that the aggregation of
evaluations over patients is linear. This assumption is
normatively defensible because the utility of a treatment
effect on one person should not (to a first approxima-
tion) depend on the number of other patients experienc-
ing the same effect. However, descriptive studies suggest
that people often have concave utility functions for lives
saved (e.g., Baron 1997; Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, John-
son, & Friedrich, 1997), and the same might be true for
the health outcomes in this study. Moreover, Greene and
Baron’s (2001) finding that people also exhibit declin-
ing marginal utility for utility casts doubt on participants’
linear aggregation of prior evaluations in both alternative
models. These aggregation difficulties do not arise in our
preferred account, because the decision for an individual
patient is simply applied to the group of patients.
In addition to our primary result (the nonsignificant
effect of perspective), we observed a nearly significant
interaction between perspective and uncertainty frame,
with a significant simple effect of uncertainty frame in
the group perspective only. Apparently, expressing un-
certainty in terms of frequencies rather than probabili-
ties led participants in the group condition to view treat-
ment more favorably. One possible explanation is that
the use of frequencies facilitated participants’ recogni-
tion that for each flu-shot option, more patients would
be spared the flu than would experience adverse reactions
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(i.e., there would be a net increase in aggregate health,
relative to the no-flu-shot option).3 This realization may
have seemed more relevant to participants considering a
decision for many patients than to those considering a de-
cision for only one patient, assuming that at least some
participants were willing to aggregate outcomes over pa-
tients (i.e., that some participants did not follow one of
the models proposed above).
Although the distinction between the individual and
group perspectives was not significant for actual rank-
ings, undergraduate participants expressed the belief that
treatment would be evaluated more favorably for many
patients than for one patient. It is not clear whether these
intuitions were simply off the mark (i.e., “folk theory”
did not match reality), or whether they represented un-
derlying tendencies that were too weak to compete with
other considerations in the ranking task. One possibility
is that the two tasks (comparing many options in one per-
spective vs. comparing one option in two perspectives)
focused participants’ attention on different aspects of the
situation, just as different evaluation modes lead to pref-
erence reversals in other contexts (e.g., Hsee, Loewen-
stein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999; Tversky, Sattath, &
Slovic, 1988). In contrast to this difference for the main
effect of perspective, the nearly significant interactions
between perspective and uncertainty frame were some-
what similar in the two tasks: treatment fared particularly
well when frequency information was coupled with deci-
sions about many patients. Perhaps there was something
to the undergraduates’ intuitions after all.
In summary, accumulating evidence indicates that the
distinction between single and multiple plays of risky
monetary gambles does not extend to risky medical treat-
ments for individuals and groups, perhaps because many
people are reluctant to aggregate the results of medi-
cal treatments over patients in the same way that they
would compute net gains or losses over monetary gam-
bles. The intriguing intuitions of our undergraduate par-
ticipants and the nearly significant interactions between
perspective and uncertainty frame qualify this conclusion
only slightly. As a practical matter, researchers interested
in understanding discrepancies between clinical guide-
lines and the treatment of individual patients may wish
to consider alternative explanations.
3 In the frequency format, a net improvement was essentially guar-
anteed because no uncertainty was reported for the numbers of patients
experiencing each outcome (see Figure 1). In the probability frame, a
net improvement may have appeared less certain because participants
themselves would have had to aggregate outcomes over patients.
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